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1 Introduction
Previous studies have established that dynamic indeterminacy can occur in two-sector overlapping-
generations (OLG) models with complicate preferences/technologies or the consumption-good
sector more capital-intensive than the investment-good sector. In this paper, we argue that if
agents select their occupation over skilled versus unskilled jobs according to their learning abil-
ity, a two-sector OLG economy may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy under simple preference and
technology specifications, regardless of the factor-intensity rankings.
Specifically, we analyze a dynamic general-equilibrium model of occupational choice in a two-
sector overlapping-generations model populated with two-period lived agents. In our economy,
all agents are endowed with one unit of labor over the entirety of their lifetime. They are identical
in every respect except for the ability to learn. It is assumed that the young who desire to be
educated must self-finance the schooling expenses. As a result, those with higher ability (or lower
disutility in schooling) borrow when young to accomplish higher education and become skilled
workers when old. For simplicity, we assume that agents only consume in the second period,
which implies forced savings in goods. Thus, under a positive interest rate, those with lower
ability (higher disutility) only work when young, whose savings facilitate both education and
physical capital investments. Endogenous educational choice, therefore, gives rise to endogenous
occupational choice between borrowers (the to-be skilled) and lenders (the unskilled). Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that the ratio of the productivity of the skilled to that of the un-
skilled is a constant exceeding one and that the production technologies of both the consumption
and the investment good sectors exhibit capital-skill complementarity.
By use of the analytical framework described above, we show that equilibrium dynamics with
occupational choice may feature multiple converging transition paths so that extrinsic uncertainty
will aﬀect the dynamic behavior of the economy. In particular, even with linear preferences,
constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production technologies and a perfect credit market, we show
that dynamic indeterminacy may arise, featuring a one or two-dimensional stable manifold in
a system with two jump variables. This result holds regardless of the factor-intensity rankings.
Accordingly, occupational choice is the sole source creating dynamic indeterminacy, as long as the
two goods are not homogeneous. Particularly, we show that by allowing occupational choice in our
two-sector framework, we add an additional choice variable which contributes to stabilize capital
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adjustments, due to capital-skill complementarity and the associated changes in net savings. As
a result, the conventional condition on the factor intensity ranking is no longer needed for local
indeterminacy.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the study on complex dynamics in the overlapping generations mod-
els. The majority of this literature has derived complex dynamics such as indeterminacy, cycles
and chaos depending either on the complicated preference structure or on the specific restrictions
on the production technologies. In the context of OLG models with capital accumulation, for
example, Boldrin (1992) demonstrates that indeterminacy arises in the presence of external in-
creasing returns, while Reichlin (1986) finds that if labor-leisure choice is allowed in a complex
preference structure, indeterminacy and chaotic equilibrium may emerge under constant returns
technology.1 Michel and Venditti (1997) consider an OLG model involving a utility function that
is nonseparable over the life cycle and show that dynamic indeterminacy can occur under the
standard neoclassical technology. The most related papers are the two-sector OLG frameworks
with constant-returns technologies by Galor (1992) and Reichlin (1992). They demonstrate that
indeterminacy may occur if the consumption-good sector uses capital more intensively than the
investment good sector.2 In contrast to all previous OLG studies, dynamic indeterminacy can
emerge in our paper even under linear preferences and constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production
technologies, without relying on any specific factor-intensity rankings. As a consequence, local
indeterminacy in our model mainly stems from the endogenous occupational choice of the young
— this alternative source of indeterminacy contributes to the existing literature.3
1 In the exchange economy models with overlapping generations, the possibility of endogenous fluctuations
entirely depends on the forms of the utilility functions; see, for example, Benhabib and Day (1982) and Grandmont
(1985). Jullien (1986) shows that the standard Diamond economy will exhibit cyclical behavior if there are multiple
state variables (money and capital).
2While Galor (1992) assumes that both production sectors have the standard neoclassical production functions,
Reichlin (1992) examines a two-secor model in the absence of factor substitution.
3The literature of occupational choice within the dynamic general-equilibrium framework includes Banerjee and
Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Fender and Wang (2003), and many cited therein. This literature
builds upon a one-sector framework in which the dynamic properties of the equilibrium have not been completely
characterized.
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2 The Model
Consider a two-sector model where sector 1 manufactures the investment good (regarded as the
numeraire) and sector 2 produces the consumption good. The economy is populated with two-
period overlapping generations. There is a continuum of individual agents of unit mass within
each generational cohort, who are identical in every respect except for their ability or disutility
of acquiring education. Individual agents do not value leisure and consume only in the second
period of their lifetime. They have no initial wealth, but each is endowed with one unit of time
which can be supplied in one of the two periods of their lifetime as a production input. In the
absence of altruism, the utility function is simply assumed linear in consumption when old.4
Agents are heterogeneous ex ante only in their disutility costs incurred in acquiring education
driven by the their innate abilities. Consider a particular agent born at time t − 1, whose
consumption occurs at time t. We denote the disutility costs by αt−1 (in units of the numeraire
investment good), which are assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e., αt−1 ∈ U [−², ²] with
0 < ² < ∞. Thus, a more able person will have less disutility from acquiring education. We
assume a pecuniary education costs of η ≥ ² > 0 per person (in units of the investment good),
where η ≥ ² ensures that no one will undertake education for fun. Since an individual agent is
not endowed with an initial wealth nor provided with a bequest, the pecuniary cost of education
must be financed by borrowing against his/her future income. We assume throughout the paper
that the credit market is perfect and hence an individual agent who wishes to borrow is always
granted with the education loan.
Denote the market (real) interest rate from period t − 1 to t as rt and the corresponding
gross rate of interest as Rt ≡ 1 + rt. Given linear utility in second-period consumption, an
individual agent born at time t − 1 will undertake education to become skilled when old if the
benefit from earning a high-skilled wage in the second period, wH,t, net of the disutility cost of
education, αt−1, outweighs the costs from the sum of the foregone earnings for an unskilled job
in the first period, RtwL,t−1, and the (interest payment included) costs of becoming educated,
Rtη. Thus, the optimal schooling decision can be expressed as to undertake education whenever:
4The assumption of one unit lifetime-endowment of labor is innocuous. The structure of two-period lived agents
who consumes only when old implies a one-to-one relationship between educational choice and occupational choice
(borrowers versus lenders). We will discuss the implications for relaxing this assumption in the concluding section.
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wH,t−αt−1 ≥ Rt(η+wL,t−1). Under proper assumption (to be specified later), there is a critical
value of αt−1, denoted α∗t−1, at which an agent is indiﬀerent between undertaking education and
remaining unskilled:
wH,t − α∗t−1 = Rt(η + wL,t−1). (1)
Should there exists such a critical point, agents of type αt−1 ∈ [−²,α∗t−1] will undertake educa-
tion and become skilled (type H) in the second period and those with αt−1 ∈ (α∗t−1, ²] remain
uneducated and work as unskilled (type L) in the first period. This gives rise to an endogenous
occupational choice under which a nontrivial fraction of agents become borrowers (the educated)
and the remainder become lenders (the unskilled). Notably, although those who decide to work
as unskilled when young save the entire wage income (forced saving), such a saving decision is
endogenously determined by occupational choice.
Within this stylized framework, it is assumed that skilled and unskilled workers are fractional
substitutes with one unit of skilled labor equivalent to δ > 1 units of unskilled labor. Thus,
letting `i,t represent aggregate employment of type i worker in period t (i = L,H),the aggregate
“eﬀective labor” can be expressed as: Nt = `L,t + δ`H,t. Free mobility of labor between the two
sectors implies that the unskilled and skilled wage rates can be expressed as:
wH,t = δWt = δwL,t. (2)
Denote Kt as the amount of capital available at the beginning of period t. Assume competitive
factor markets and 100 percent depreciation of the capital stock. Both consumption and invest-
ment goods are produced using labor and capital with Cobb-Douglas technologies that exhibit
constant returns. Under the eﬀective labor setup, it is easily seen that our production technolo-
gies feature capital-skill complementarity (as an increase in δ leads to a higher marginal product
of capital).
Denote the relative price of the consumption good in units of the investment good as p. Then,
competitive profit conditions that equate the price with the unit cost in each sector yield:
1 = Rθ1t W
1−θ1
t , (3)
pt = R
θ2
t W
1−θ2
t , (4)
where θi, i = 1, 2, are constant capital cost shares that take values between 0 and 1. Assuming
that θ1 6= θ2, we can solve (3) and (4) to obtain a unique pair of factor prices (Rt, Wt) for any
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nonnegative pt, that is,
Rt = R(pt) and Wt =W (pt). (5)
The eﬀects of the relative price of goods on factor returns depend crucially on the factor-intensity
rankings. When the consumption good is produced using capital (labor) more intensively, a
higher relative price of the consumption good results in a higher (lower) return on capital and
lower (higher) wage rates for both the unskilled and the skilled. This is in fact a straightforward
application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to a three-factor model with two factors that are
fractionally substitutable (skilled labor and unskilled labor).
Let xt−1 denote the proportion of the generation born at time t− 1 who become educated. It
follows that in labor market equilibrium, we have:
`H,t = xt−1, (6)
`L,t−1 = 1− xt−1. (7)
It is straightforward to show that, with a uniform distribution of disutilities of education across
the population, xt−1 = (α∗t−1 + ²)/(2²), from which we obtain:
α∗t−1 = −(1− 2xt−1)², (8)
which provides a linear relationship between the proportion of the labor force which becomes
educated and the critical value of disutility cost of education.
To close the model, we need to specify the goods market clearing conditions. The aggregate
consumption of type i at time t is given by,
CH,t = (wH,t −Rtη)xt−1/pt, (9)
CL,t = wL,t−1Rt(1− xt−1)/pt. (10)
Utilizing (2), (5), (9) and (10), we can write the demand for the consumption good in period t
as:
Cdt = {R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + [δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt)]} /pt. (11)
Using the duality concepts, the supply of the consumption good at time t is equal to
Cst = R
0(pt)Kt +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1). (12)
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Thus, the market-clearing condition for the consumption good at period t, Cst = C
d
t , implies:
pt
£
R0(pt)Kt +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1)
¤
= R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + [δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt)] . (13)
Finally, investment good market clearing is captured by:
Kt + ηxt−1 =W (pt−1)(1− xt−1), (14)
which equates the demand for loanable funds (the left-hand side) with the supply of loanable
funds (the right-hand side).
3 Steady-State Equilibrium
We are now ready to define dynamic competitive equilibrium and non-degenerate steady-state
equilibrium in our two-period OLG economy with endogenous educational choice.
Definition 1 A dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is a tuple of positive quantities {CH,t,
CL,t, `H,t, `L,t, Kt, xt}, a tuple of positive prices {wH,t, wL,t, Rt, pt} and a critical value α∗t ∈
[−², ²], such that (i) schooling is optimal: type αt−1 ∈ [−²,α∗t−1] become educated and type αt−1 ∈
(α∗t−1, ²] remain uneducated, where α
∗
t−1 satisfies (1); (ii) aggregate consumption of the skilled
and unskilled are determined by (9) and (10), respectively; (iii) competitive profit conditions are
given by (2), (3) and (4); (iv) allocation of labor across sectors and labor market equilibrium are
given by (6), (7) and (8); (v) goods market equilibrium are achieved as in (13) and (14).
Definition 2 A non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium (NSSE) is a DCE represented by a tuple
{CH , CL, `H , `L,K, x,wH , wL, R, p,α∗} with all variables being constant over time.
In case when all variables take on their steady-state values, we drop time subscripts.
Although there are 11 endogenous variables in our system, the recursive nature of the model
enables us to summarize the system in terms of the sequence of the fraction of the skilled and
the relative price (i.e., {xt, pt}) alone. In particular, by combining the market clearing condition
for both the consumption and investment goods (13) and (14) to eliminate the sequence of the
capital stock {Kt}, we, on the one hand, have:
pt
©
R0(pt) [(1− xt−1)W (pt−1)− ηxt−1] +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1)
ª
= R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt). (15)
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Under the Cobb-Douglas production technologies, the elasticities,
ptR
0(pt)
R(pt)
= −(1− θ1)
θ1 − θ2
≡ Θr and
ptW
0(pt)
W (pt)
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
≡ Θw, (16)
are constant. It is clear that if the consumption good is more capital (resp. labor) intensive than
the investment good, i.e., if θ1 > (resp. <) θ2, then Θr < 0 and Θw > 1 (resp. Θr > 1 and
Θw < 0). Using Θr and Θw, we can rewrite (15) to obtain a “goods market equilibrium condition”
(referred to as the EE locus):
(Θr − 1)R(pt) [(1− xt−1)W (pt−1)− ηxt−1] +ΘwW (pt)(1− xt) = (1−Θw)δW (pt)xt−1. (17)
On the other hand, we can substitute (2), (5), and (8) into (1) to derive an “optimal schooling
relationship” (referred to as the SS locus):
δW (pt) + ²(1− 2xt−1) = R(pt)[η +W (pt−1)]. (18)
The EE and SS loci, (17) and (18), govern the dynamical system in the pair {xt, pt}. In the
steady state, xt = x and pt = p, which satisfy:
x =
½
1 +
[(1−Θw)δW (p) + η(Θr − 1)R(p)]
W (p)[R(p)(Θr − 1) +Θw]
¾−1
, (19)
x =
1
2
+
1
2²
{[δ −R(p)]W (p)− ηR(p)}. (20)
In general, an NSSE may not exist. However, if both ² and η are suﬃciently small and if δ is
above a critical value that depends on the values of elasticities θ1 and θ2, then the steady-state
equilibrium values of (x, p) are uniquely determined by (19) and (20). Substituting these values
into (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8), we obtain the steady-state equilibrium values of factor prices
(wH , wL and R), labor demand for each type ( `H and `L) and the critical value of the disutility
cost of education (α∗). Finally, utilizing (9), (10) and (14), we obtain steady-state equilibrium
consumption (CH and CL) and capital (K) in a recursive manner. We can establish:
Theorem 1 The non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (17) and (18)
exists and is unique, if both ² and η are suﬃciently small.
Proof: First, as ² converges to zero, the graph of (20) on the (p, x)−plane converges to the vertical
line p = pe > 0, where pe is the solution to
R(p)η
W (p)
+R(p) = δ. (21)
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Since both Θr and Θw are constant and either Θr < 0 and Θw > 1, or Θr > 1 and Θw < 0 holds,
pe uniquely exists that satisfies (21), irrespective of factor-intensity rankings. Substituting pe into
(19), we see that the steady-state x also uniquely exists in the open interval (0, 1). Finally, we
note that (21) implies that 0 < R(pe) < δ and that as η converges to zero, R(pe) converges to δ
which is assumed to be greater than one. Therefore, it is guaranteed that R(pe) is greater than
one as long as both ² and η are suﬃciently small. Q.E.D.
That is, in order to ensure an NSSE, the dispersion of heterogeneity and the pecuniary costs
of education cannot be too large whereas the productivity diﬀerential between the skilled and
the unskilled cannot be too small. One may have thought that these assumptions are restrictive.
Standard numerical analyses (summarized in Tables 1A and 1B), however, suggest that, over a
large range of plausible parameter values, we can obtain a unique NSSE even by allowing ² to
be as high as 0.2 (recall that ² must be bounded by η) and η to be as high as 0.3 (or more than
35 percent of the unskilled wage), where the value of δ can be taken from 1.25 to 3.5 (or for the
skilled wage to exhibit a 25 to 250 percent markup over the unskilled wage).
It is interesting to examine that the eﬀects of a more favorable educational environment
(captured by either higher δ or lower η). For brevity, consider the simple case with ² converging
to zero in which the steady state values of (x, p) can be solved in a recursive manner (i.e., p
is determined by (21) alone). From (21), a more favorable educational environment leads to
a lower (higher) relative price of the consumption good in units of the investment good if the
consumption-good sector uses labor (capital) more intensively than the investment-good sector.
Regardless of the factor intensity ranking, however, the return on capital always rises while the
unskilled wage always falls in response to a favorable change in undertaking education.
4 Equilibrium Dynamics
We are now prepared to characterize the dynamic properties of the steady-state equilibrium. In
order to gain intuition, let us start with two degenerate cases, one with no occupational choice
and another with only one sector (homogeneous consumption and investment goods).
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4.1 The Absence of Occupational Choice
Without occupational choice, we simply set xt = 0 (together with ² = η = 0). Then the dynamical
system reduces to:
Kt = Wt−1 (22)
(Θr − 1) eR(Wt)Wt−1 = −ΘwWt, (23)
where eR(Wt) = (Wt)− 1−θ1θ1 is derived from the competitive profit condition (3). Substituting (22)
into (23) and manipulating it yield a single dynamic equation:
Kt+1 =
µ
1−Θr
Θw
¶θ1
(Kt)
θ1 . (24)
Since θ1 ∈ (0, 1) and 1−ΘrΘw > 0 regardless of the factor intensity rankings, capital evolves
monotonically and is stable. The existence and the uniqueness of a non-degenerate steady-state
equilibrium can thereby be established. Moreover, as Kt is a state variable, we can conclude:
Theorem 2 If the steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (22) and (23) exists, it is
always locally determinate.
The result suggests that endogenous occupational choice plays an essential role for the steady
state to be locally indeterminate. The reader should be alerted that our framework diﬀers from
Galor (1992) because of the absence of endogenous saving decision once occupational choice is
removed. Thus, in this degenerate case, the steady state is always locally determinate.
4.2 The Case of One-Sector Production
The next question to inquire is whether a steady state can be locally indeterminate when the
economy degenerates to one sector (i.e., θi = θ and pt = 1). The competitive profit condition
becomes: 1 = RθtW
1−θ
t ,which can be used to express Rt as a decreasing and convex function of
Wt:
Rt = Ω(Wt) ≡ (Wt)−
1−θ
θ , (25)
Moreover, within this one-sector framework, the capital-labor ratio is given by,
Kt
(1− xt) + δxt−1
= − 1
Ω0(Wt)
. (26)
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We can now rewrite the EE locus as:
Ω0(Wt)[Wt−1 − (η +Wt−1)xt−1] + [(1− xt) + δxt−1] = 0, (27)
whereas the SS becomes:
δWt + ²(1− 2xt−1)−Ω(Wt)(η +Wt−1) = 0. (28)
These two equations constitute the dynamical system for {xt,Wt}. Finally, the loanable funds
equilibrium (or the investment-good market clearing condition) is given by:
Kt + ηxt−1 =Wt−1(1− xt−1), (29)
which governs the evolution of the capital stock.
It is tedious but straightforward to show that if 1θ > δ > max
n
θ
1−θ , 1 + η − ε
o
, then there
exists a unique non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium in which a nontrivial fraction of high-
agents become unskilled workers and a nontrivial fraction of low-skilled agents undertake edu-
cation and become skilled workers.5 To characterize the dynamics of this one-sector model of
occupational choice, we begin by noting that under this one-sector framework, {xt} and {Wt} are
tied by a unique relationship (26), the factor market equilibrium relationship, for any t. More
specifically, for historically given K0 and x−1, equation (26) implies:
K0 = −
1
Ω0 (W0)
[(1− x0) + δx−1] . (30)
It implies that once x0 is chosen, the associated factor price W0 is determined by (30). Thus,
the system features only one free jump variable. If the steady state is a saddle point, we have a
unique equilibrium path converging to the steady state.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of the Dynamics) For suﬃciently small ² or η, the steady-
state equilibrium of the dynamical system (27) and (28) is locally determinate, featuring a unique
one-dimensional saddle path.
5This can be done by manipulating (27) and (28) in the steady state to obtain a single equation in terms of W :
F (W ) =
1
2
(1 +
δW
²
)−
?
1−Ω(W )(1− θ)/θ
1−Ω(W )(1− θ)/θ + ηΩ0(W )− δ +
Ω(W )(η +W )
2²
?
= 0.
We can then use the mean value theorem to prove the existence of a unique root of F (W ) = 0 under the required
conditions. The detailed proof is available upon request.
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Proof: Totally diﬀerentiating (27) and (28), the Jacobian matrix of the one-sector model evaluated
at the steady-state value of (x,W ) is given by:
eJ =
⎡
⎣
2²
Z [(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + Z
Ω
Z [(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + (1− x)Ω 0
2²
Z
Ω
Z
⎤
⎦ .
where Z ≡ δ − (η +W )Ω 0 > Ω > 1 (noting that Ω 0 < 0 < Ω 00). In the neighborhood of the
steady state, (1− x)W − ηx = −[(1− x) + δx]/Ω 0 > 0. Straightforward manipulations yields the
trace and the determinant:
Tr( eJ) = 2²
Z
[(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + Z + Ω
Z
> 0,
Det( eJ) = Ω− 2²
Z
(1− x)Ω 0 > Ω > 1.
Evaluating the characteristic function at {−1, 1}, we have:
Λ(−1) = 1 + Tr( eJ) +Det( eJ) > 0
Λ(1) = − 1
Z
©
(Z −Ω)(Z − 1) + 2²[(1− θ)(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00
ª
.
Therefore, if ² is suﬃciently small or if either η is not too large, then Λ (1) < 0 because Z > Ω > 1.
If this is the case, Λ
³eλ´ = 0 has two positive real roots, eλ1 and eλ2, which satisfy 0 < eλ1 < 1 < eλ2.
As a result, the dynamical system holds a local saddle-point property and, since only one of
{xt,Wt} can jump freely, the steady state is locally determinate. Q.E.D.
Although the above theorem relies on small values of ² or η, our numerical exercises reported
in Table 2 suggest that even with fairly large values ² or η over a large range of plausible para-
meter values, the saddle-point stability property is quite robust. Therefore, despite endogenous
occupational choice, dynamic indeterminacy in general cannot arise if the OLG economy features
only one sector that produces a single homogeneous good.
4.3 The General Setup
We now turn to examining the stability properties in the general two-sector setup with endogenous
occupational choice. To begin, we claim that given the initial value K0, both x0 and p0 can be
chosen freely in our two-sector dynamical system. To see this, notice that at t = 0, equation (14)
does not restrict the choice of x0 and p0 (because only x−1 and p−1 are involved).6 By expressing
6At t = 0, the behavior of the initial old is passive where the good market equilibrium condition and the optimal
schooling relationship are not well-defined.
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equations (14), (17) and (18) at t = 1, we have:
K1 + ηx0 = W (p0)(1− x0),
(1−Θw)δW (p1)x0 = (Θr − 1)R(p1) [(1− x0)W (p0)− ηx0] +ΘrW (p1)(1− x1),
δW (p1) + ²(1− 2x0) = R(p1)[η +W (p0)].
Obviously, there are five endogenous variables, x0, p0, x1, p1 and K1, implying that these three
equations do not restrict the choice of x0 and p0, either. Throughout t = 2, 3, ..., this argument
continues to hold true. In other words, x and p are “jump variables” whose initial values can be
chosen freely.
Then, denote J as the Jacobian matrix of the linearized 2× 2 dynamical system evaluated at
the steady-state value of (x, p) and Jij as the (i, j)’s element of J . Total diﬀerentiation of (19)
and (21) gives:
J11 =
1
ΘwW
∙
2²
B
Q− (1−Θw)δW − (Θr − 1) (η +W )R
¸
,
J12 =
1
ΘwW
RW 0
B
[Q+B(Θr − 1)(1− x)] ,
J21 =
2²
B
,
J22 =
RW 0
B
,
whereQ ≡ (Θr−1)[(1−x)W−ηx]R 0+[Θw(1−x)−(1−Θw)δx]W 0 > 0 andB ≡ δW 0−(η+W )R 0 <
(>) 0 if θ1 < (>) θ2.
As ² converges to zero, so does J21, implying that the characteristic equation converges to:
Λ(x) ≡
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ λ− J11 −J12
0 λ− J22
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = 0. (31)
In view of (31), we find the following:
Theorem 4 If a non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (17) and (18)
exists, then for suﬃciently small ², it is locally indeterminate, regardless of the factor intensity
rankings.
Proof: From (31), as ² converges to zero, one root converges to J11 and another to J22. Using
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the definition of Θw and Θr and applying the steady-state SS locus, we can derive:
J22 =
ΘwpRW
δΘwpW − (η +W )ΘrpR
=
θ1RW
θ1δW − (θ2 − 1)(η +W )R
=
θ1W
η +W
∈ (0, 1).
Thus, one root (denoted λ1) is positive and within the unit circle. Similarly, taking ² → 0, we
can manipulate J11 to obtain:
J11 =
− [(1−Θw)δW + (Θr − 1) (η +W )R]
ΘwW
=
θ2δW + (1− θ2) (η +W )R
θ1W
=
δ
θ1
> 1,
implying another root (denoted λ2) is positive but outside the unit circle. Since both x and p are
jump variables, the dynamical system is locally indeterminate. Q.E.D.
When ² is not small, the underlying dynamic properties become too complicated to be char-
acterized analytically. Accordingly, we perform numerical exercises to show the robustness of our
results. Although we have examined many cases with various parameter values, we report the
most informative ones in Tables 1A and 1B, for the two cases where the consumption-good pro-
duction is more capital- or labor-intensive.7 In the benchmark cases, we select the skill markup
as δ = 2.5, and the ability diﬀerential and the pecuniary cost of education as 2² = η = 0.2. The
capital cost shares in the two sectors are chosen as 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. These parameter
values give a steady-state fraction of the skilled as x = 0.53 (0.58) and the steady-state gross
rate of interest as 2.01 (1.96) for the case where the consumption-good production uses capital
(labor) more intensively. Again, we impose the constraints: η ≥ ² and δ > R > 1. Thus, we
perturb 2² from 0.1 to 0.4, η from 0.1 to 0.3 (with η ≥ ²) and δ from 1.25 to 3.5 (consistent
with dynamic eﬃciency). Our results indicate that for these plausible parameters, the dynamical
system is always locally indeterminate, with a positive stabilizing root and another positive root
outside the unit circle.
7For example, we have experimented a wide range of {θ1, θ2}, with |θ1 − θ2| as small as 0.001 and as large as
0.5, and found that our results are robust.
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In summary, we have established the local indeterminacy property regardless of the factor
intensity rankings, contrasting sharply with the stability condition obtained in the standard two-
sector OLG model without occupational choice where the steady state may be indeterminate only
when the consumption-good sector is more capital intensive than the investment good sector (cf.
Galor 1992 and Reichlin 1992). A natural question arises: what are the underlying forces giving
rise to dynamic indeterminacy?
From Theorems 2 and 3, it is clear that in a standard OLG framework without complicate
preference/technology specifications, dynamic indeterminacy cannot arise if occupational choice
is absent or if it features only one sector that produces a single homogeneous good. In the one
sector case, there are lack of reinforcing forces in which the price dynamics (factor prices) are
purely driven by the dynamics of the capital stock and the steady-state becomes a saddle. Under
a two-sector setup with independent price dynamics, the conventional condition on the factor
intensity ranking (for the consumption-good sector to be more capital intensive) ensures that not
only the price but the quantity dynamics are stable in the absence of occupational choice.
By allowing occupational choice in such a two-sector overlapping-generations setting, we add
an additional choice variable which contributes to stabilize capital adjustments. More specifically,
due to capital-skill complementarity, an increase in the proportion of the population who are
skilled raises the capital rental, which is a stabilizing force. Moreover, as the mass of the skilled
increases, the aggregate costs of education increase whereas the loanable funds supply decreases.
Both of these reduce net savings and hence capital investment, which again help stabilize capital
adjustments. As a result, the conventional condition on the factor intensity rankings is no longer
needed for local indeterminacy.
Finally, one may inquire whether the factor intensity rankings matter at all for dynamic
adjustments. Let focus on the case with suﬃciently concentrated distribution of ability (² small).
In this case, the local dynamics feature a one-dimensional stable manifold over two jump variables
(which can be expressed as xt = φ(pt)). Consider that, at a particular period, agents expect the
long-run relative price of consumption to be higher (p increases). When the consumption sector is
more capital intensive, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that the returns to capital must go
up more than proportionately whereas the returns to labor must go down. As a result, the capital
stock rises and the occupational choice is in favor of being unskilled (x decreases). Thus, along
the transition path, there will be downward adjustments in x associated with upward adjustments
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in p (i.e., φ0 < 0). When the consumption sector is more labor intensive, the transition path will
feature upward adjustments in both x and p (i.e., φ0 > 0). Summarizing, although the factor
intensity rankings do not aﬀect the stability properties, they matter for the configuration of the
underlying dynamic adjustments. Moreover, the configuration of such dynamic adjustments in
the relative price and occupational choice help justify why dynamic indeterminacy can arise,
driven by self-fulfilling prophecies.8
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a two-sector overlapping-generations model with endogenous occupa-
tional choice where borrowing is required for investment in education. We have demonstrated that
the economy may involve indeterminacy of converging paths, implying that expectations-driven,
endogenous fluctuations can emerge. In our model the utility function is linear in consump-
tion in the old age, the production technologies take the Cobb-Douglas functional forms with
constant returns, and the credit market is perfect. Therefore, dynamic indeterminacy in our
economy mainly stems from the presence of occupational choice behavior of the agents, though
the two-sector structure is essential for the result.
A natural question to inquire is what if we generalize the borrower-lender relationship. In
our benchmark economy, we have assumed that the agents to be educated are borrowers and the
agents who do not plan to be educated are lenders. This is because all agents are assumed to be
two-period lived and to consume only in their old age. If we consider instead three-period lived
agents who consume in both the second and the third periods, there need not be a one-to-one
relationship between educational decision (educated versus uneducated) and occupational choice
(borrowers versus lenders). Such a generalization involves a more complicate preference structure
and intertemporal reinforcing forces, thus increasing the likelihood of dynamic indeterminacy as
one would expect.
8More precisely, updating the SS locus by one period and applying the stable manifold relationship, we get:
[η+W (pt)]R(pt+1)− δW (pt+1) = ²(1− 2φ(pt)). When the consumption sector is more capital intensive (θ1 < θ2),
an expected increase in pt+1 (sunspot driven) raises the LHS. Since φ0 < 0, an raise in pt can change occupational
choice to restore the equilibrium relationship. Since dpt+1/dpt > 0, such an increase in pt leads to an increase in
pt+1 and hence the expectations are fulfilled. The case of θ1 > θ2 can be worked out by similar arguments, where
R0 < 0, W 0 > 0 and φ0 > 0.
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